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PANEL 4:
TRANSLATIONAL
EXPECTATIONS AND ISSUES:
MAKING IT WORK IN PRACTICE
AMANDA PUSTILNIK, DAVID SEMINOWICZ, AND M. KAYLIE GIOIOSO
SPEAKERS: DR. MARTHA FARAH, PHD,* JUDGE NANCY GERTNER,** AND
STACEY TOVINO***
I.

INTRODUCTION

The final panel of the conference focused on translational expectations
and issues, and turned to questions relating to whether and how the
neuroimaging of pain may be useful in legal settings. The panel represented
a range of expertise, including a neuroscientist who works on translational
issues in law and science, a former federal judge, and a professor of law
whose scholarship emphasizes the history of medicine.1 Dr. Martha J.
Farah, PhD spoke first, focusing on the dual promise and challenge of using
neuroimaging as medical and legal evidence of pain.2 She described the
Copyright © 2015 by Amanda Pustilnik.
* Director of the Center for Neuroscience & Society.
** U.S. District Judge, District of Massachusetts (ret.); Adjunct Professor of Law &
Neuroscience, Harvard Law School; Faculty member, Center for Law, Brain & Behavior (MGH).
See
Judge
Nancy
Gertner,
Faculty,
CTR.
L.,
BRAIN
&
BEHAV.,
http://clbb.mgh.harvard.edu/faculty/nancy-gertner/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2015).
*** Professor of Law, University of Nevada. See Stacey A. Tovino, Faculty, UNLV WILLIAM S.
BOYD SCH. LAW, http://www.law.unlv.edu/faculty/stacey-tovino.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2015).
1. Dr. Martha Farah, PhD, Judge Nancy Gertner, & Prof. Stacey Tovino, Imaging the Brain,
Changing Minds: Chronic Pain Neuroimaging and the Law Symposium, Panel 4: Translational
Expectations and Issues: Making it Work in Practice (Apr. 25, 2014) [hereinafter Panel 4]
(transcript on file with the editors).
2. Id. at 1; see also id. at 1–3 (explaining that neuroimaging will not be adequate evidence of
pain until there is a standard way of describing the subjective psychological nature of pain); see
also, e.g., Adam J. Kolber, Pain Detection and the Privacy of Subjective Experience, 33 AM. J.L.
& MED. 433, 433–34 (2007) [hereinafter Pain Detection] (noting that researchers have been able
to use neuroimaging to identify precise brain regions that enable individuals to experience pain
and the amount of pain a person is experiencing); Adam J. Kolber, The Experiential Future of the
Law, 60 EMORY L.J. 585, 599 (2011) [hereinafter The Experiential Future] (acknowledging that
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ways in which neuroimaging technologies (functional MRIs (“fMRI”) in
particular) are already useful in the field of psychiatry, changing basic
research, challenging long standing disease definitions and descriptions,
and suggesting new avenues for treatment.3 She analogized between the
utility of fMRIs in psychiatric illnesses and chronic pain disorders because
both involve the search for the physiology of disorders that are otherwise
phenomenological and subjective.4 She expressed the hope that
neuroimaging may produce a diagnostic marker for different kinds of
chronic pain conditions, but cautioned that more research may show that
pain is more various and complex than we currently imagine.5 Indeed, we
may not find a biomarker or neural signature for many different kinds of
pain experience.6 She expressed great optimism that fMRIs and other
neuroimaging techniques may produce legally relevant results.7 While
acknowledging the group-to-individual inference problem and the reverse
inference problem (discussed below),8 she suggested that these are
although neuroimaging is being used in pretrial litigation, there are still numerous obstacles to
overcome before neuroimaging can be used in clinics or courtrooms).
3. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 1; see generally Paul M. Matthews et al., Applications of fMRI in
Translational Medicine and Clinical Practice, 7 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 732, 735–37,
741 (2006) (reviewing the many applications of fMRI, including its use in selecting optimal
treatment for patients with psychiatric diseases, establishing brain patterns associated with
schizophrenia, and gaining better understanding of genetic factors).
4. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 1–2; see also Oguz Demirci & Vince D Calhoun, Functional
Magnetic Resonance Imaging – Implications for Detection of Schizophrenia, 4 EUROPEAN
NEUROLOGICAL REVIEW [EUR. NEUR. REV.], no 2, 2009, at 103, 103 (U.K.) (explaining that due
to the subjective nature of schizophrenia, there is no objective method of diagnosing it, but using
fMRI may be valuable in investigating the physiological disturbances that lead to the
manifestation of the disease); Pain Detection, supra note 2, at 434, 441–42 (explaining that pain
has many phenomenological components and it is hard to properly evaluate an individual’s level
of pain).
5. See Panel 4, supra note 1, at 2–3 (describing the need for an accurate method of
describing chronic pain in order to be able to rely on neuroimaging as evidence of pain because,
for example, chronic pain of someone with phantom limb might be different from the chronic pain
of a bad back); see also The Experiential Future, supra note 2, at 597 (explaining that the new
technologies available will improve methods of assessing pain in the future, but these new
technologies may never be able to make intersubjective assessments of pain).
6. See Panel 4, supra note 1, at 2 (explaining that the ability to accurately map the different
types of pain onto information from brain imaging will not be possible until there is a method of
assessing the subjective nature of pain); see also The Experiential Future, supra note 2, at 589
(explaining that even though scientists have made tremendous progress in assessing pain with
more precision, the technology may never be perfect).
7. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 3; see also The Experiential Future, supra note 2, at 610
(explaining that accurate assessment of pain using the fMRI may help juries properly assess pain
awards).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 84–88 (discussing Dr. Farah’s view on the reverse
inference problem); see generally, Russell A. Poldrack, Inferring Mental States From
Neuroimaging Data: From Reverse Inference to Large-Scale Decoding, 72 NEURON, 692, 692
(2011) (describing the many critiques of reverse inference in analyzing mental processes).
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problems of experimental design, not principle problems that would prevent
the development of a medically and legally useful tool.9
The Honorable Nancy Gertner (ret.) emphasized the challenges of
using pain neuroimaging in the legal system.10 She lauded Professor
Farah’s optimism and agreed that neuroimaging protocols relating to
chronic pain may achieve sufficient accuracy and reliability to pass the
standards of admissibility in court.11 However, she sounded several
important notes of caution. First, she emphasized a basic noncommensurability between scientific measurements of pain and the legal
category of “pain and suffering.”12 “Suffering,” she noted, is a normative
concept.13 It relates to value judgments about how a claimant experienced
his or her injury or disability, and how much legal decision makers believe
he or she should be compensated for that distress.14 She suggested,
accordingly, that even a “100 percent” perfect pain-o-meter could not fully
substitute for the kinds of judgments that the law asks judges and juries to
make.”15 She further emphasized several institutional considerations that
should lead to caution relative to the use of neuroimaging.16 She discussed
the variability in judges’ decisions regarding the admissibility of expert and
scientific evidence, the appellate courts’ limited review of trial courts’
9. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 5; see generally Poldrack, supra note 8, at 692, 694, 696
(acknowledging some of the limitations of reverse inference, but explaining the frameworks for
getting around some of the experimental limitations).
10. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 6; see Jean Macchiaroli Eggen & Eric J. Laury, Toward a
Neuroscience Model of Tort Law: How Functional Neuroimaging Will Transform Tort Doctrine,
13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 235, 303–04 (2012) (describing the incompatibility between
science’s focus on methodology and law’s focus on normative judgments, and how this makes it
difficult to translate scientific knowledge to legal certainty in the courtroom).
11. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 5; see Shaun Cassin, Comment, Eggshell Minds and Invisible
Injuries: Can Neuroscience Challenge Longstanding Treatment of Tort Injuries?, 50 HOUS. L.
REV. 929, 949 (2013) (citing an example of how a New York state court allowing a PET scan as
evidence of brain trauma may, by extension, mean that other uses of neurosciences will pass the
general acceptance standard applied to evidence in the courtroom).
12. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 6; see also Pain Detection, supra note 2, at 441 (explaining that
the phrase “pain and suffering” is broadly construed in the legal context as to permit recovery for
not only physical pain, but for fright, nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, mortification, shock,
humiliation, and indignity). Cf. Cassin, supra note 11, at 960 (explaining neuroscience’s inability
to predict psychological states such as emotional distress).
13. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 6; see also Pain Detection, supra note 2, at 441, 446 (explaining
that the issue of attaching monetary value to the quality and quantity of pain that a plaintiff has
experienced is a normative one).
14. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 6; see also Pain Detection, supra note 2, at 446 (explaining that
the process of pain valuation involves attaching an appropriate monetary value to the quality and
quantity of pain suffered by the plaintiff).
15. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 6; see also Pain Detection, supra note 2, at 446 (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Torts on how difficult it is to value pain and suffering in the court).
16. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 6–7, 14–15.
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evidentiary determinations, the distorting role played by differences in
parties’ resources, and the possible “Christmas tree effect”—the effect of
being dazzled by lights and colors—that neuroimaging might have on
jurors.17 She expressed the hope that judges, neuroscientists, and legal
scholars can work together to produce clear standards that can be applied in
every courtroom to uniformly guide judges and juries.18 She concluded on
the optimistic note that if pain neuroimaging develops further and if
uniform admissibility standards are generated, the law may no longer view
claimants who have subjective complaints (like emotional pain and
invisible but chronic physical pain conditions) with skepticism.19
Professor Stacey Tovino, a legal scholar and historian of medicine,
offered both constructive and critical remarks about the ways in which legal
institutions use and respond to medical evidence.20 She described several
concrete cases for pain neuroimaging in law, discussing health insurance
reimbursement law, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Social
Security Law.21 Turning to her more cautionary remarks, she briefly
described the history of visualization technologies in the courtroom, and
discussed historical and contemporary norms relating to the verification and
treatment of pain.22 In particular, she informed the conference about the
history of underestimating the pain of underprivileged classes of people and
the ways that that this history continues to influence medical treatment and
legal decisions today.23

17. Id.; see also Jennifer Kulynych, Psychiatric Neuroimaging Evidence: A High-Tech
Crystal Ball?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1261 (explaining that state courts rely on the Frye test to
evaluate admissibility of scientific evidence while federal courts rely on a more comprehensive
validity analysis set forth by the Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
509 U.S. 579 (1993)); Cassin, supra note 11, at 944, 951 (commenting on how cost can be a
general deterrent to the use of neuroimaging in tort cases, and noting the “seductive allure” that
neuroscience has on the jury).
18. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 8; see also Eggen & Laury, supra note 10, at 284–85 (providing
a model that can guide judges and attorneys when confronted with functional neuroimaging
evidence in tort cases).
19. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 16; see also Eggen & Laury, supra note 10, at 284, 289
(suggesting that the model proposed by the author can help substantiate claims of emotional
distress).
20. See Panel 4, supra note 1, at 11–12 (giving examples of how hospitals and hospices could
avoid being liable for neglecting to provide effective pain management control if the patient or
their family could not provide evidence of pain).
21. Id. at 10–12.
22. See id. at 9–10, 14 (giving examples of the use of x-rays to show pain in the courtroom
and how historically, pain has been treated differently in minority populations or less privileged
individuals).
23. Id. at 9; see Dania Palanker, Note, Enslaved By Pain: How the U.S. Public Health System
Adds to Disparities in Pain Treatment for African Americans, 15 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. &
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REMARKS OF PROFESSOR FARAH: HOW TO CREATE LEGALLY
USEFUL TOOLS WITH FMRI

Professor Farah opened the panel by describing the ways in which
fMRI of the brain has already been useful in understanding subjective,
emotional states other than pain.24 She described the ways in which
neuroimaging (fMRIs in particular) “has already proven useful in
psychiatry for research in revealing the pathophysiology of different
symptoms and disorders . . . .”25 Further, neuroimaging has proven useful
“in identifying [endophenotypes] . . . , for [different psychiatric illnesses],
for genetic research, [and] for drug development.”26
Neuroimaging allows researchers who study psychiatric illnesses to
proceed in more systematic ways than in the past, Professor Farah
explained.27 Previous research generally has been limited to testing
“whether a certain molecule actually cures somebody or prevents somebody
at high risks for schizophrenia from getting it.”28 Instead, using a fMRI,
researchers can identify patterns in the brains of people with psychiatric
illness, how these patterns differ from those in the brains of healthy control
subjects, and then determine whether a particular drug “shifts that pattern
[or] diminishes activation in the areas of concern.”29 For example, in the

POL'Y 847, 858 (2008) (discussing the interrelationship between race and socioeconomic status,
and the disparities in pain treatment).
24. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 1; see generally Matthews et al., supra note 3, at 732, 735–37
(explaining the application of the fMRI to the treatment of emotional disorders, such as depression
and schizophrenia).
25. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 1; see also Matthews et al., supra note 3, at 732, 736–37
(explaining how neuroimaging has been helpful in translational medicine and clinical practice in
understanding complex diseases).
26. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 1; see also Matthews et al., supra note 3, at 732, 736–37
(explaining that the fMRI has been used for the characterization of certain neurophysiologically
based phenotypes that are associated with genetic disorders and for selecting optimal treatment for
patients with psychiatric diseases).
27. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 1; see also Abhisek C. Khandai & Howard J. Aizenstein, Recent
Advances in Neuroimaging Biomarkers in Geriatric Psychiatry 2, 4 (June 1, 2014) (previously
published in 15 CURR PSYCHIATRY REP. 360 (2013)) (on file with NIH), available at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3667151/pdf/nihms-474933.pdf.
28. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 1; see also S Miyamoto et al., Treatments for Schizophrenia: A
Critical Review of Pharmacology and Mechanisms of Action of Antipsychotic drugs, 10
MOLECULAR PSYCHIATRY 79, 79–85 (2005) (providing a review of the evolution of the treatment
of schizophrenia in the context of antipsychotic drug development).
29. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 1; see also Lisa J. Burklund & Matthew D. Lieberman, Advances
in Functional Neuroimaging of Psychopathology, 18 PHIL., PSYCHIATRY, & PSYCHOL. 333, 334
(2011) (noting that the fMRI can elucidate neural regions and processes that may have abnormal
functions in certain patients compared to healthy persons, providing useful information to
optimize treatment).
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case of depression, neuroimaging has allowed researchers to see that people
suffering from depression show higher levels of activity in particular
regions of the amygdala than do non-depressed people;30 neuroimaging
permits researchers to test which drugs reduce excess amygdalar activity.31
These “research uses [of neuroimaging] matter” already have “been
valuable.”32 In the clinical setting, neuroimaging could be useful in the
future for “diagnosis, maybe treatment response prediction, [and]
prognosis;”33 however, its utility is less clear.34 Using neuroimaging for
these purposes currently is “not the standard of care.”35
Debates about the uses of neuroimaging in the psychiatric research
community could be useful in understanding the role of neuroimaging for
the diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment of chronic pain, Professor Farah
opined.36 The appropriate uses of neuroimaging became a major issue in
drafting the Fifth Edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (“DSM”).37 Published by the American Psychiatric Association,
the DSM embodies a consensus of the psychiatric community (or at least of
the drafting committee that authors the DSM) discussing the recognized
30. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 1; see also J. Paul Hamilton et al., Functional Neuroimaging of
Major Depressive Disorder: A Meta-Analysis and New Integration of Baseline Activation and
Neural Response Data, 169 AM J PSYCHIATRY 693, 693 (2012) (stating that neural response
studies using negative stimuli showed greater amygdalar response in patients with major
depressive disorders compared to healthy individuals).
31. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 1; see also Callie L. McGrath et al., Toward a Neuroimaging
Treatment Selection Biomarker for Major Depressive Disorder, 70 JAMA PSYCHIATRY 821, 824–
25 (2013), available at http://archpsyc.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=1696349 (showing
that the left amygdala is one of the brain regions that demonstrates significant treatment outcome
interaction using escitalopram and cognitive behavior therapy).
32. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 1; supra text accompanying notes 29–31.
33. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 1; see also Glenda M. MacQueen, Will There Be a Role for
Neuroimaging in Clinical Psychiatry?, 35 J. PSYCHIATRY NEUROSCIENCE 291, 291 (2010) (stating
that neuroimaging methods are being used not only for accurate diagnosis of psychiatric
symptoms, but also for monitoring treatment responses and clinical outcomes).
34. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 1; see also MacQueen, supra note 33, at 292 (discussing the need
to investigate the feasibility and barriers of incorporating neuroimaging modalities in routine
clinical practice).
35. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 1; see also MICHAEL FIRST ET AL., AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N,
CONSENSUS REPORT OF THE APA WORK GROUP ON NEUROIMAGING MARKERS OF PSYCHIATRIC
DISORDERS 5–6 (2012) (explaining that peer reviewed scientific literature does not yet provide
studies that support the use of a diagnostic imaging biomarker with high reliability or
neuroimaging measures with high sensitivity or specificity in detecting psychiatric disorders).
36. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 1.
37. Id.; see generally AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, THE DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS [hereinafter DSM] (5th ed. 2013); see also Seth J. Gillihan &
Eric Parens, Should We Expect “Neural Signatures” for DSM Diagnoses?, 72 J. CLINICAL
PSYCHIATRY 1383, 1388 (2011) (concluding that neuroimaging modalities are less accurate and
more expensive than behavioral methods in diagnosing psychiatric disorders, and are thus unlikely
to become a useful tool for DSM based diagnoses).
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psychiatric illnesses and their diagnostic criteria.38 The DSM has long been
criticized as failing to define psychiatric illnesses in ways that map onto
specific and unique pathophysiology—that is, psychiatric and emotional
disorders that have physiological correlates and causes.39 Yet, it remains
unclear whether the same pathophysiology underlies all cases of what the
DSM would identify as the same disorder, nor is it clear whether the same
pathophysiology may give rise to sufficiently different presentations across
patients, and whether the patients would receive different diagnoses.40
Accordingly, the National Institute of Mental Health (“NIMH”) is
directing its funding of psychiatric research toward studies that use
neuroimaging to identify whether there are unique neurological correlates
of different psychiatric diagnoses, and to attempt to identify the ways in
which the brains of people with distressing psychiatric symptoms function
differently than the brains of matched controls.41 This direction on the part
of NIMH led to conflict with the drafters of the DSM because “NIMH
thinks it’s all a bad way of classifying patients and so we’re only going to
fund people who use [neuroimaging]. It is quite a mess.”42
This “mess,” Professor Farah discussed, “is instructive for the problem
we’re talking about” because pain scientists are looking for neural markers
of pain in the same way that psychiatric researchers are looking for neural
markers of psychiatric diseases:43

38. DSM, supra
note 37; see also
DSM, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N,
http://www.psychiatry.org/practice/dsm (last visited Mar. 18, 2015).
39. See, e.g., Sally L. Satel, Why the Fuss over D.S.M.-5?, Sunday Review, N.Y. TIMES (May
11, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/12/opinion/sunday/why-the-fuss-overthe-dsm-5.html?_r=0 (stating that the DSM is an “imperfect guide to predicting” treatments
because psychiatric diagnoses are based on clinical signs that tend to cluster—not on the
mechanism of the illness, like with bacterial pneumonia).
40. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N., A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR DSM-V 33–34 (David J.
Kupfer et al. eds., 2002) (stating that the current classification in psychiatry resembles medicine of
50 to 100 years ago, when the pathophysiology of many diseases was not yet known).
41. Strategic Research Priorities, Strategy 1.3: Identify and Integrate Biological Markers
(Biomarkers) and Behavioral Indicators Associated with Mental Disorders, NAT’L INST. MENTAL
HEALTH, http://www.nimh.nih.gov/research-priorities/strategic-objectives/strategy-13.shtml (last
visited Feb. 8, 2015).
42. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 1; see also Press Release, Thomas R. Insel, Dir., Nat’l Inst. of
Mental Health, & Jeffrey A. Lieberman, President-elect, Am. Psychological Ass’n, DSM-5 and
RDoC: Shared Interests (May 13, 2013) (on file with NIMH), available at
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/news/science-news/2013/dsm-5-and-rdoc-shared-interests.shtml (noting
that NIMH’s Research Domain Criteria (“RDoC”) project hopes to create new ways of classifying
mental disorders that directly reflects modern brain science).
43. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 1.
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A neural signature of pain would be a diagnostic marker.
What you’re aiming to do is map a psychological entity—
schizophrenia, depression, pain, whatever—onto a
physiological entity [as indicated by] a certain pattern of
BOLD44 response or functional conductivity.45
...
[Though it is] not trivial to get these things right, there’s
good reason for optimism that imaging will be useful
here.46
Professor Farah noted that the challenges of identifying the
physiological correlates and causes of pain, or of other psychologically
mediated phenomena like depression, requires careful conceptual work as
well as intensive “bench” or investigational work.47 To find the
physiological correlates, “we [first] need to get the psychological
description right.”48 Professor Farah referred to this process of identifying
and categorizing the subjective phenomena into natural kinds as “carving
the bird at the joints.”49 This, she noted, has not yet occurred in psychiatry,
and “even [the DSM’s] strongest defenders would say it probably isn’t
really carving the bird of psychopathology at the joints. It’s a sort of good
enough system that has high reliability, and so much of our knowledge is
encoded relative to it that we can’t afford to throw it out.”50
Instead of a physiologically robust description of psychiatric illnesses,
“we have certain psychological concepts of ability and disability and so
forth, but we really don’t have a good parse of mental problems into natural
44. Blood-oxygen level-determination (“BOLD”) technique is a widely used fMRI method
that measures brain activity by measuring cerebral blood flow. See Nikos K. Logothetis, The
Neural Basis of the Blood-Oxygen-Level-Dependent Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging
Signal, 357 PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF LONDON B: BIOLOGICAL
SCIENCES [PHIL. TRANS. R. SOC. LOND. B] 1003, 1010 (2002) (U.K.)
45. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 1–2; see also Logothetis, supra note 44, at 1008, 1010
(describing the BOLD technique in depth).
46. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 2.
47. Id. at 1–2; see also Division of Neuroscience and Basic Behavioral Science (DNBBS),
NAT’L INST. MENTAL HEALTH, http://www.nimh.nih.gov/about/organization/dnbbs/index.shtml
(last visited Mar. 18, 2015) (listing, as a high research priority, the development of new
physiological models to understand biological functions in normal and abnormal mental
functions).
48. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 2; see also Division of Neuroscience and Basic Behavioral
Science (DNBBS), supra note 47.
49. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 2.
50. Id. at 2; see also Press Release, DSM-5 and RDoC: Shared Interests, supra note 42
(stating that the DSM is still the “contemporary consensus standard” for the diagnosis and
treatment of mental disorders).
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kinds.”51 Similarly, she noted, “we don’t have a very good parse of pain
into the natural kinds of pain.”52 We have clinical and legal categories, such
as “real pain, malingered pain, chronic pain, subacute [pain], whatever,” but
these general, descriptive labels may not map onto what happens in the
brain.53 She suggested that it will be necessary to achieve “an
intertheoretical reduction,” in which researchers work to harmonize the
ways they describe and categorize pain with the ways that pain and pain
disorders are represented in the brain.54 Some of our descriptive labels may
not map onto the neurophysiological differences of how different kinds of
pain are experienced and how various pain disorders disturb normal pain
processing in the brain.55
This comes back to the idea that “you need to carve the pain bird and
the brain bird [at its joints],” or achieve a clear understanding of the
relationship between the phenomenology and the physiology.56 Professor
Farah noted that there is some relationship between acute and chronic pain,
but they are sufficiently different in that the “articulation” between them
might constitute a “joint.”57 Further, there is “evidence that different kinds
of chronic pain are different physiologically. So, the chronic pain of
somebody with phantom limb might be different than the chronic pain of a
bad back or a burn victim . . . .”58 Thus, “carving the bird at the joints” may

51. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 2; see also Thomas A. Widiger & Douglas B. Samuel,
Diagnostic Categories or Dimensions? A Question for the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders—Fifth Edition, 114 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 494, 494 (2005) (discussing the problems
with the idea of absolute boundaries in categorical divisions of mental disorders and the
limitations of this model).
52. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 2.
53. Id. at 2. Cf. C. Maestu Unturbe et al., Pneumatic Device for Somatosensorial and Pain
Stimulation Compatible with Magnetic Functional Resonance (fMRI) and Magnetoencefalography
(MEG) DISNESO- 02, XXVI CONGRESO ANUAL DE LA SOCIEDAD ESPAÑOLA DE INGENIERIA
BIOMÉDICA [CASEIB] 372, 374 (2008) (concluding that there is less variability in descriptions of
central pain responses because of imaging technology).
54. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 2.
55. Id. Cf. The Experiential Future, supra note 2, at 597–99 (explaining the various ways
researchers have analyzed different pain stimuli that activate different parts of the brain).
56. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 2; see also A.Vania Apkarian et. al., Pain and the brain:
Specificity and Plasticity of the Brain in Clinical Chronic Pain, 152 J. PAIN S49, S50 (2011)
(explaining that the connection between consciousness and biological processes of pain are
tentative).
57. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 2; see also Acute vs. Chronic Pain, CLEVELAND CLINIC,
http://my.clevelandclinic.org/services/anesthesiology/pain-management/diseases-conditions/hicacute-vs-chronic-pain (last visited Mar. 18, 2015) (describing the differences between acute pain,
which is shorter in length and often has an identifiable cause, and chronic pain, which is persistent
over time and is often incurable and poorly understood).
58. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 2; see also Apkarian et al., supra note 56, at S55 (discussing how
distinct pain involves “unique brain regions”); A D (Bud) Craig, Mapping Pain in the Brain,
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not be as straightforward as finding the distinctions among acute pain,
chronic pain, emotional pain, and malingered pain. There may be many
important phenomenological and physiological distinctions that we are only
beginning to see and understand in the brain. “Again,” she emphasized, “we
need to sort out these distinctions before we can confidently say I have a
chronic ‘pain-o-meter.’”59
Professor Farah then emphasized the importance of the
phenomenological and neurological differences between different kinds of
pain.60 She praised the work of Tor Wager, Karen Davis, and others in
inducing acute pain in the lab and identifying its neurological correlates.61
She stressed, however, that “we have good clinical, phenomenological and
some biological reasons to think that chronic and acute pain are pretty
distinct beasts.”62 If one of these researchers were to “come[] back to us in
a couple of years and say[] I’ve got this pattern classifier that works 99
percent of the time [that] say[s] who’s in acute pain and who isn’t . . . . You
would be thrilled to have that, but you would not want to use it to decide
whether somebody who’s applied for disability benefits is in chronic
pain.”63 She then emphasized again that “[y]ou really wouldn’t want to do
that.”64
Professor Farah argued that “people go to extremes in evaluating [the
merits of] functional neuroimaging.”65 Commenters either view the fMRI

WELLCOME TRUST, http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/en/pain/microsite/science2.html (last visited Mar.
18, 2015) (explaining how different feelings of pain have their own pathways to the brain).
59. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 3; see also The Experiential Future, supra note 2, at 599 (noting,
despite the developments in the imaging of pain, that the research is still in its early stages and
requires “further elaboration and replication”).
60. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 3.
61. Id. at 2; see generally Karen D. Davis et al., Functional MRI of Pain- and AttentionRelated Activations in the Human Cingulate Cortex, 77 J. NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 3370 (1997)
(utilizing fMRIs to determine if regions of the brain were reacting the way they were anticipated
to react); Tor D. Wager et al., An fMRI-Based Neurologic Signature of Physical Pain, 368 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1388 (2013) (using fMRI to assess pain in particular subjects); Jamil Zaki et al.,
Different Circuits for Different Pain: Patterns of Functional Connectivity Reveal Distinct
Networks for Processing Pain in Self and Others, 2 SOC. NEUROSCIENCE 276 (2007) (exploring
the overlapping and distinct experiences of pain for self and others).
62. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 2; see also Acute vs. Chronic Pain, supra note 57 (explaining the
differences between acute and chronic pain).
63. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 2.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 3; see also, e.g., R. Todd Constable, Challenges in fMRI and Its Limitations, in
FUNCTIONAL MRI: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND CLINICAL APPLICATIONS 75 (Scott H. Faro & Feroze
B. Mohamed eds., 2006) (addressing the challenges of fMRIs in function); Humera Ahsan et al.,
Application and Advantage of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging and Blood Oxygen Level
Dependent (BOLD) Imaging Modality, 59 JOURNAL OF PAKISTAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION [J PAK
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“as this great panacea that’s going to make psychology obsolete, because
why do you need all this mind stuff when you can just look at the brain,” or
they go to the other extreme of dismissing the fMRI as meaningless because
“they make these beautiful pictures out of these funky [BOLD] signals that
[vary] depending on what plane you got off of” or other trivial factors that
can distort the BOLD signal.66 Accordingly, Professor Farah took some
time “to address some of the technical issues with imaging and with
identifying these natural kinds at the brain level.”67
First, she addressed the question of variability in the BOLD signal.68
She noted that other speakers had given “reasons to be cautious when
interpreting the results of [BOLD] MRI,” yet she “disagree[d] with . . . the
implication that this is a fundamental limitation of [BOLD] MRI that will
keep it from delivering informative results to people . . . who want to . . .
figure out if somebody is in chronic pain or not.”69 Understanding the
obstacles that can interfere with the reliability of the BOLD signal does not
make the BOLD signal useless.70
These problems show, in Professor Farah’s view, that at least two
factors need to be addressed to ensure that the research using the fMRI is
useful.71 The first is that “if you’re going to develop [neuroimaging]
methods for real world use, [including legal and clinical use, researchers]
need to standardize them on the relevant populations.”72 This, she said, “is
totally doable.”73 She acknowledged that “these [experiments] are not easy
to do or cheap to do, but they are perfectly doable empirical research.”74
Additionally, she emphasized the use of correct control conditions
when scanning an individual for research or clinical purposes. If an
MED ASSOC] 794 (2009) (exploring the benefits of using these techniques in diagnosing certain
types of conditions).
66. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 3; see also REBECCA A. CLAY, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N,
FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING: A NEW RESEARCH TOOL 2 (2007) (“A brain
scanning technology called functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) isn’t quite a mind
reader, but it comes close.”); see generally Logothetis, supra note 44, at 1008 (noting that the
BOLD contrast is the mainstay of fMRIs because of “its reasonably high sensitivity and wide
accessibility”).
67. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 3.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. But see also Craig M. Bennett & Michael B. Miller, fMRI reliability: Influences of
Task and Experimental Design, COGNITIVE, AFFECTIVE, & BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE (Aug. 10,
2013) https://labs.psych.ucsb.edu/miller/michael/PDF/Bennett-CABN-2013.pdf (finding that
many factors impact the reliability of fMRI data).
71. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 3.
72. Id. at 3–4.
73. Id. at 3.
74. Id.
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individual who claims to have pain does not produce a BOLD signal
consistent with the kind of pain he or she claims to have, then it would
become important to determine if the subject’s brain produces anomalous
results in response to other forms of stimuli (the control conditions).75 So,
she opined, “if you don’t get the normal networks showing up in resting
[BOLD] or for chronic pain . . . and you also don’t get normal responses
and networks for word reading, color perception, et cetera, then of course
you’re going to conclude that there’s something misleading about the
[BOLD] response in this person—not that this person doesn’t have pain.”76
Professor Farah then turned to two other, common objections to the
use of fMRI or other forms of neuroimaging for diagnostic or other
individual uses: the group-to-individual inference problem, and the inverse
inference problem.77 She acknowledged the concerns about “group-toindividual [inferences] and worries [that] inverse inferences” are
“worthwhile rules of thumb.”78 She then continued that she wants to “be
somewhat provocative in saying an individual is just a group of one. There
is not . . . [a] categorical difference between inferences to individuals and
inferences to groups.79 It’s all about the variance and about having the
appropriate standard sample to relate the individual to.”80
Professor Farah then discussed the concept of reverse inference as it
applies to the use of neuroimaging as proof of pain. In this context, she
noted, reverse inference becomes problematic when the interpreter of an
fMRI concludes that a particular area of the brain became activated because
the person was in pain, when in fact any number of other conditions could
have caused the observed activation.81 Professor Farah provided a helpful
75. Id.; see also Bennett & Miller, supra note 70 (stating that reliability for controls is higher
than reliability in clinical disorders).
76. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 3.
77. Id.; see also Benjamin Bumann, The Future of Neuroimaging in Witness Testimony, 12
AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 873, 874–75 (2012) (discussing the various issues of making a reverse
inference from groups to individuals in BOLD fMRI responses); Brain Decoding and Inverse
Inference
in
fMRI:
A
Brief
Introduction,
PARIETAL,
https://team.inria.fr/parietal/research/fmri_decoding/introduction/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2015)
(noting problems that researchers see with the inverse inference approach).
78. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 3.
79. Id. at 4; see also Martha J. Farah et al., Functional MRI-Based Lie Detection: Scientific
and Societal Challenges, 15 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 123, 126 (2014) (explaining that
determining the accuracy of fMRI based lie detection on an individual includes assessing the same
"sensitivity and specificity" of a group of individuals in the general population).
80. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 4–5 (discussing this problem in the example of United States v.
Semrau, 693 F.3d 510, 522 (2012)).
81. Id. at 5; see also Martha J. Farah, Brain Images, Babies, and Bathwater: Critiquing
Critiques of Functional Neuroimaging, 44 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.–Apr. 2014, at S19, S24
(2014) [hereinafter Brain Images, Babies, and Bathwater] (noting that a problem with reverse
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example: “if pain activates the anterior cingulate cortex (“ACC”), but so
does cognitive conflict, and so does attention to internal physiological state,
then just when you see the ACC light up, you can’t know that it was from
pain when it could have been from other things.”82 In this particular
scenario, any reverse inference that ACC activation was exclusively due to
pain would be misleading or mistaken.83
While Professor Farah acknowledged that reverse inferences like this
one can be a problem in interpreting neuroimages, she went on to argue that
“not all reverse inference is pernicious and misleading.”84 Instead, with
“due diligence” and proper studies that take into account “all the different
psychological states that somebody could be in,” it becomes possible to
determine “what the probability is that [the research subject is] in any one
of the possible states that could have caused [activation]” during the fMRI
scanning session.85 Accordingly, if the research shows that pain is likely to
cause a “particular pattern of activation” more so than anything else, then
one can say (to some degree of certainty) that the individual is in pain.86
Professor Farah concedes that while “you definitely can’t say 100 percent
for sure,” it could be possible to “say it’s this likely that the person is in
pain.”87 The issue then, of course, is the degree of accuracy. The scientific
and legal communities accept high percentage probabilities as valid in other
areas of study, as in genetic testing and identification, but Professor Farah
believes the same can hold true in using neuroimaging as evidence of the
likelihood of pain.88
inference was discovered in a study of the anterior cingulate cortex (“ACC”), which shows that
there are multiple psychological states that can cause activation).
82. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 5; see also Brain Images, Babies, and Bathwater, supra note 81
(“Activity in this area has been elicited by processes as diverse as attention to one’s own heartbeat
and emotional regulation.”).
83. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 5; see also Brain Images, Babies, and Bathwater, supra note 81
(noting that the “wanton use of reverse inference” can lead to flaws in the data that is received
from the fMRI).
84. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 5; see also Brain Images, Babies, and Bathwater, supra note 81
(stating that reverse inference is not inherently invalid if the interpreters of these studies recognize
that there is a "range of psychological processes that can activate a region under a given set of
circumstances").
85. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 5; see also Brain Images, Babies, and Bathwater, supra note 81
(noting that although reverse inferences are prone to criticism, it is possible that they can be valid
if framed correctly).
86. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 5; see also Brain Images, Babies, and Bathwater, supra note 81
(explaining that a valid reverse inference can be gleaned from the knowledge of a "full range of
psychological processes" that could produce pain).
87. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 5; see also Brain Images, Babies, and Bathwater, supra note 81
(hypothesizing that there is a 75 percent chance of high probability with the right evidence).
88. See Martha J. Farah, Neuroethics: The Ethical, Legal, and Societal Impact of
Neuroscience, 63 ANN. REV. PSYCHOLOGY 571, 588 (2012) [hereinafter Impact of Neuroscience]
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Accepting Professor Farah’s assertion that reverse inference as to pain
and neuroimaging may be a problem in the design of any particular
experiment or study is not a problem per se, the question then becomes:
how far are we from being able to use these images in a meaningful way?
Professor Farah predicts that this potential use of brain imaging is not very
far away, commenting that she would be surprised if the research had not
reached this point within ten years.89 While recognizing these studies will
require no small amount of work, Professor Farah remains optimistic that
“if what you want is a method that for in certain predetermined populations
[there can be something that] can give you substantially increased
confidence that they are in pain or chronic pain . . . it just seems extremely
obtainable.”90
Professor Greely built on Professor Farah’s comments by proposing a
research agenda for how to develop functional neuroimaging to the point
where it could be admissible in court as evidence of pain. He suggested that
researchers gather a large cohort of subjects in a particular age range who
suffer from a common form of chronic pain, “like the most common form
of chronic lower back pain.”91 These subjects should be control matched
with a large pain free cohort.92 Scanning and comparing these large
populations should help researchers to “see if we can come up with . . .
markers that have . . . substantial positive predictive and negative predictive
value.”93 For these studies to be rigorous and replicable, Professor Greely
emphasized the importance of standardized procedures and instructions.94
(comparing genetics and neuroscience as means of predicting probabilities of human behavior);
see also BRENT GARLAND, NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN, MIND AND THE SCALES OF
JUSTICE 5–6 (2004) (explaining that neuroscience has a strong predictive ability that will be useful
in the courtroom).
89. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 5; see also Martha J. Farah, Emerging Ethical Issues in
Neuroscience, 5 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1123, 1128 (2002) ("One need not project very far into
the future to see the increasing role of neuroscience in our lives . . . .").
90. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 5; see also Owen D. Jones et al., Law and Neuroscience, 33 J.
NEUROSCIENCE 17624, 17629 (2013) (noting that neuroscience makes it possible for a person's
mental state to be determined, which can ultimately be valuable to the legal system).
91. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 17.
92. Id. at 17; see also Pain Detection, supra note 2, at 444 (referring to a German research
study in which MRIs were used to compare a group of individuals with chronic low back pain to a
group of healthy control subjects in order to determine the differences in brain images).
93. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 17; see also Impact of Neuroscience, supra note 88, at 576 ("For
example, if the best prediction from a person's brain activity is to a very high or low value of a
psychological trait, one could conclude that the person is in fact unlikely to be low or high,
respectively, on that trait.").
94. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 17; see also Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through a
Scanner Darkly: Functional Neuroimaging as Evidence of a Criminal Defendant's Past Mental
States, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1119, 1154, 1190 (2010) (noting that there is risk of distortion of brain
images without these standardized procedures).
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Laboratories that do such research could be independently certified, as with
laboratories that process DNA.95
In regards to Professor Greely’s proposal, it might be important to test
a range of subjects (e.g., not all white college students) under a range of
conditions.96 Professor Haythornthwaite noted that chronic pain varies
considerably over time, and suggested that assays of chronic pain would
need to be repeated multiple times with the same patient since a single scan
could provide a misleading “snapshot.”97 With these caveats, and with large
sample sizes, standardization, and certification, Professor Greely stated that
“there’s a good chance we will get there and should get there.”98
III.

REMARKS OF JUDGE NANCY GERTNER: THE LAW’S NORMATIVE
AND INSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS CANNOT BE “SOLVED” BY SCIENCE

Judge Gertner expressed serious concerns regarding the use of
neuroimaging as proof of pain in the courtroom. She worried that the
scientific value of the images may get lost in translation, and doubted the
courts’ ability to “rationally embod[y] the science in a way that everyone
can understand.”99 The concerns, she said, are twofold: first, Judge Gertner
questioned judges’ ability “to be gatekeepers of this science” in light of the
lax standards for the admissibility of scientific evidence; second, she
worried that the “potential for distortion” is particularly high when lay
jurors are asked to interpret complex scientific images.100
95. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 17; see also STEVE OLSON ET AL., INST. OF MED., INTEGRATING
LARGE-SCALE GENOMIC INFORMATION INTO CLINICAL PRACTICE: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 48
(2012) (noting that the certification process should include "quality control systems," procedures
"for repeating unclear or unexpected results," and ensuring that "positive results are not false
positives").
96. See SALLY SATEL & SCOTT O. LILIENFELD, BRAINWASHED: THE SEDUCTIVE APPEAL OF
MINDLESS NEUROSCIENCE 195 n.33 (noting that a range of test subjects can differ by "social
behavior, moral behavior, fairness, performance on IQ tests, and analytical abilities").
97. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 21; see also CHRONIC PAIN: ASSESSMENT, DIAGNOSIS, AND
MANAGEMENT 62 (Michael S. Margoles & Richard Weiner eds., 1999) (indicating that chronic
pain may change from day to day).
98. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 17; see also Brown & Murphy, supra note 94, at 1154, 1207
(stating that standardization reduces distortion, and large sample sizes are sufficient to show
normal variance of subjects); OLSON ET AL., supra note 95 (stating that certification of
laboratories is important for validity in testing).
99. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 8; see also Judge Nancy Gertner, Commentary on the Need for a
Research Culture in the Forensic Sciences, 58 UCLA L. REV. 789–90 (2011) [hereinafter
Research Culture in the Forensic Sciences] (noting that prosecutors and courts benefit the most
from forensic evidence because other parties may face the disincentive to challenge that the judge
abused their discretion by allowing this evidence during a trial).
100. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 5–6; see also Adam Teitcher, Comment, Weaving Functional
Brain Imaging into the Tapestry of Evidence: A Case for Functional Neuroimaging in Federal
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Judges’ discretionary role in deciding what expert and scientific
evidence may be admitted could present particular difficulties relative to
neuroimaging.101 As an initial matter, Judge Gertner noted that the
threshold for admitting evidence is not very high.102 Under the Federal Rule
of Evidence 401, a party need only show that the evidence is relevant, or
that it “makes a fact more likely” in order for that evidence to be
admitted.103 This low bar to admissibility gives individual judges a great
deal of discretion as to what will be allowed into the courtroom.104 The
very same piece of evidence, Judge Gertner suggested, could “come into
court A and not come into court B,” which is a troubling possibility.105
Judges’ decisions about what evidence to admit or exclude is “subject to all
the distortions” that impair decision makers generally, including
institutional pressures, the decision makers’ own varying knowledge and
perspectives, and the effects of parties’ resources.106 What “we typically
see,” Judge Gertner related, is that parties with greater resources are more
successful in getting their evidence before a judge and getting a favorable
ruling on the admissibility of that evidence.107 This is not because judges
favor better resourced parties, but rather because such parties can afford to
generate more and better quality expert evidence and then present the
evidence to the court with highly skilled advocates and experts.108

Criminal Courts, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 355, 384, 389 (2011) (explaining Judge Gertner's
frustration with the admission of scientific evidence because of the question of its reliability).
101. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 7; see also Research Culture in the Forensic Sciences, supra note
99, at 790 (listing several issues relating to deficiencies in scientific evidence).
102. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 6; see also Teitcher, supra note 100, at 358 n.12 (explaining that
evidence is relevant when a fact becomes "more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence").
103. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 6; see also FED. R. EVID. 401 ("Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has
any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and
(b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.").
104. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 7; see also Teitcher, supra note 100, at 371 (noting that trial
judges hear a lot of the facts of the case, giving them a significant amount of discretion in
admitting evidence).
105. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 7; see also Teitcher, supra note 100, at 369–70 (explaining that
the evidential inquiry of judges is mostly subjective when determining relevance and reliability).
106. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 6; see also Craig M. Cooley & Gabriel S. Oberfield, Increasing
Forensic Evidence's Reliability and Minimizing Wrongful Convictions: Applying Daubert Isn't the
Only Problem, 43 TULSA L. REV. 285, 286, 291–92, 379 (2007) (noting that there are many
reasons for distortions in evidence, which can detrimentally impact the legal system).
107. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 6; see also Nancy Gertner, National Academy of Sciences
Report: A Challenge to the Courts, 27 CRIM. JUST. 8, 11 (2012) ("[U]nequal and limited resources
make it particularly difficult to raise forensic challenges.").
108. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 15; see also REFERENCE MANUAL ON FORENSIC EVIDENCE 19
(Fed. Judicial Ctr. et al. eds., 3d ed. 2011) (stating that plaintiffs are more likely to choose to pay
for expensive experts).
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The process of appellate review does not provide much of a safeguard
against the inconsistent admission of evidence, as the standard for reversal
is increasingly difficult to meet.109 Judge Gertner notes that evidentiary
decisions are reviewed by appellate courts in a way that is “enormously
deferential[] to the trial judge[s].”110 To get a ruling reversed, a party must
show that a judge has abused his or her discretion, which requires
“show[ing] that no conscientious judge acting intelligently could honestly
have taken the view expressed by the judge.”111 Put more plainly, she said,
this standard requires the complaining party to demonstrate that the judge
“act[ed] like a moron” or was “dishonest” in order to win an appellate
reversal of a trial court’s evidentiary ruling pursuant to the abuse of
discretion standard.112 When viewed in conjunction with the high degree of
discretion involved in admitting or denying evidence in the first place, the
lack of any meaningful review of these rulings is particularly disconcerting.
Judge Gertner went on to voice another concern that the complex
science behind neuroimaging can be easily distorted and misinterpreted
when presented to a lay jury.113 Specifically, Judge Gertner worried about
the group-to-individual problem introduced by Professor Farah.114 She
noted that the sophistication of Professor Farah’s numerical explanation is
“not matched in the courtroom.”115 Instead, juries are often presented with
simplified, colored brain images that advocates easily can distort.116 Judge
Gertner explained that “[i]f a bunch of numbers went on a screen, it would
be easier to understand and say oh it’s just numbers” and data about a

109. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 7; see also Amanda Peters, The Meaning, Measure, and Misuse
of Standards of Review, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 233, 244–46 (2009) (discussing the standards
for reversal used by the court, and the difficulties associated with meeting these standards).
110. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 7; see also Jennifer L. Katz, Kelly v. State: Limiting Trial
Courts’ Broad Discretion to Make Evidentiary Decisions and Managing Trials, 66 MD. L. REV.
1162, 1170 (2007) (discussing the trial court’s broad discretion pursuant to the rules of evidence,
limited only by the requirement that decisions are not arbitrary and capricious, or beyond reason).
111. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 7; see also Peters, supra note 109, at 244–45 (discussing the
wide meaning of abuse of discretion).
112. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 7. Cf. Peters, supra note 109, at 245 (discussing the various
standards applied by courts under “abuse of discretion,” which is not defined by law).
113. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 7 (arguing that since the courts’ function as a gatekeeper is
limited, there is a risk that juries can distort the evidence presented to them).
114. Id. at 6; see also id. at 3 (reporting that Prof. Farah highlighted the importance of
considering group-to-individual problems and the issues concerning inverse inferences).
115. Id. at 6; see also id. at 4–5 (discussing issues concerning the use of fMRI data and
statistical inferences).
116. Id. at 6; see also David M. Eagleman, Neuroscience and the Law, 45 HOUS. LAW.,
Mar./Apr.
2008,
at
36,
38
(2008),
available
at
http://www.thehoustonlawyer.com/aa_mar08/indice.htm (noting that jurors could be convinced
that the pictures are more important than they really are).
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phenomenon.117 “[B]ut what goes onto the screen is something that looks
like a brain and [that] is colored,” and so instead of looking like the
statistical data that it is, it looks like an actual thing—like a photograph or
an x-ray of the brain, which it is not.118 She noted that even she, with an
interest in scientific evidence, was initially “astonished to learn that the
little colors on the [fMRI images] didn’t represent my brain” or any
particular brain, but instead are statistical re-creations of numerical data
generated from the averages of many scans of many brains, and that any
one brain might respond quite differently.119 Her own experience raises the
question of “[c]an you adequately communicate that to jurors?”120
Accordingly, this evidence runs the great risk of “being tremendously
prejudicial precisely because it looks like a brain and has the aura of
science.”121
While Judge Gertner finds this science “tremendously interesting,” her
concerns cause her to want to “press the pause button” on introducing
evidence consisting of pain neuroimaging in the courtroom.122 In our
current world, she recommends developing stricter standards that judges
must adhere to in admitting evidence, in addition to training sessions for
judges on the relevant science.123 Hoping to avoid inconsistent rulings,
Judge Gertner urged the legal community to establish “some controls

117. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 6; see also E. Spencer Compton, Note, Not Guilty by Reason of
Neuroimaging: The Need for Cautionary Jury Instructions for Neuroscience Evidence in Criminal
Trials, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 333, 345–46 (2010) (discussing how jurors have trouble fully
grasping neuroimaging data even when provided with expert testimony). But see Joe S. Cecil et
al., Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: Lessons from Civil Jury Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REV.
727, 757–58 (1991) (discussing how juries struggle to comprehend statistical information).
118. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 6; see also Compton, supra note 117 (noting how jurors have
trouble fully grasping neuroimaging data even when provided with expert testimony regarding its
statistical information). But see So Yeon Choe, Comment, Misdiagnosing the Impact of
Neuroimages in the Courtroom, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1502, 1522 (2014) (discussing a study that
found that laypeople consider neuroimages as credible because they are viewed as photographs of
the brain).
119. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 14; see also Stacey A. Tovino, Functional Neuroimaging
Information: A Case for Neuro Exceptionalism?, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 415, 422 (2007)
(describing how fMRI images are developed and used).
120. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 14.
121. Id. at 6; see also Laurence R. Tancredi & Jonathan D. Brodie, The Brain and Behavior:
Limitations in the Legal Use of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 33 AM. J.L. & MED.
271, 289 (2007) (discussing concerns regarding how people view fMRI images as concrete images
and as truth); Choe, supra note 118.
122. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 8.
123. Id.; see also Choe, supra note 118, at 1542–44 (discussing the need for training for judges
and a new standard by which judges should review fMRI evidence).
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earlier . . . before we start fighting it out in court,” encouraging further
discourse between judges, legal scholars, clinicians, and neuroscientists.124
Judge Gertner then raised several issues relating to the normative and
institutional aspects of legal proceedings. These normative and institutional
issues prevent neuroimaging and other forms of scientific evidence from
mapping directly onto legal questions and processes.125 She turned first to
the normative role of the jury in matters involving the valuation of damages
for pain and suffering. Jurors considering neuroimaging evidence of pain (if
admitted) generally would not be making determinations such as “yes or
no,” but rather questions of how “to quantify pain [and suffering].”126 The
category of “pain and suffering . . . may sound redundant to the scientists in
the room,” but, she emphasized, it is not.127 The term “suffering,” she
explained, is “really a measure of how bad we feel about you [the victim or
plaintiff], [and] it’s really a lay measure [or] a normative judgment” about
relative merit.128 Because of the normative aspect of what “suffering”
means and its value, suffering “does not map onto the science [about pain]
that we’re talking about.”129 This absence of an identity between what pain
imaging could show or what pain quantification could measure, and what
the law means by “suffering” and the values that juries ascribe to “pain and
suffering” is at the root of “why we’re getting closer but [we] will never
[get] there . . . .”130
Judge Gertner then noted that Michael Pardo and Amanda Pustilnik
had spoken about “social framework evidence,” and that perhaps
neuroimaging evidence of pain and other subjective states could “come in
like social framework evidence.”131 With social framework evidence, “you
124. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 15.
125. Id. at 14.
126. Id. at 6.
127. Id.; see also infra text accompanying note 128–29.
128. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 6; see also Mark A. Geistfield, Due Process and The
Determination of Pain and Suffering Tort Damages, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 331, 346 (2006)
(discussing concerns that pain and suffering are a normative judgment for juries).
129. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 6; see also Margaret C. Rodgers, Comment, Subjective Pain
Testimony in Disability Determination Proceedings: Can Pain Alone be Disabling?, 28 CAL. W.
L. REV. 173 (1991) (discussing that even though everyone experiences pain, not all suffer the
same degree of pain).
130. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 6; see also Geistfield, supra note 128, at 339 (discussing the
various factors that cause juries to have difficulty identifying and quantifying pain and suffering).
131. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 14; see also Joel Greenspan, Adam Kolber, & Michael Pardo,
Imaging the Brain, Changing Minds: Chronic Pain Neuroimaging and the Law Symposium, Panel
2: “Excess Pain,” Hyperalgisia, and the Variability of Subjective Experience 13 (Apr. 25, 2014)
[hereinafter Panel 2] (transcript on file with the editors) (discussing the potential of using
neuroimaging evidence in social science contexts, similar to the use of eyewitness identification
evidence).
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make it clear [to the jury that this doesn’t describe any individual, but that
the evidence represents] averages in the same way that social psychology
about eyewitness identification comes in.”132 When experts offer evidence
about the average reliability of eyewitness identification, “[t]hey’re not
saying, ‘oh, this person’s identification was unreliable,’” but they’re saying
that issues arise when witnesses make eyewitness identifications.133 Judge
Gertner expressed the view that “neuroscientific framework” evidence
could be the best and most plausible use for fMRI or other neuroimaging of
pain and subjective states, but suggested that jurors still might remain
confused and unable to distinguish group averages from individual data,
particularly when faced with colorful pictures that look like real brains.134
Judge Gertner concluded with some observations about the
relationship between the skepticism toward pain and the development of
law in areas related to pain.135 She explained that “one of the reasons why
[areas of law such as tort] did not pay attention to mental health [complaints
and] to subjective complaints of pain [is] because of the problem of
dissembling.”136 In the absence of objective proof in contexts where parties
stand to gain, the law must be concerned about “the notion that people
would lie about it.”137 The development of the law, which makes a
distinction between physical and emotional injuries, “actually followed that
concern” about fraud relating to claims of conditions that are not

132. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 6, 14; see also Panel 2, supra note 131 (discussing how through a
social framework, a shift can occur regarding how neuroimaging evidence can be used); see also
Mark S. Boudin, Behavioral Science Evidence in the Age of Daubert: Reflections of a Skeptic, 73
U. CIN. L. REV. 867, 911 (2005) (noting court findings that eyewitness evidence is similar to the
knowledge of behavioral scientists, such as psychologists).
133. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 14; see also Boudin, supra note 132 (stating that experts provide
testimony regarding the average eyewitness’s reliability).
134. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 6; see also Teitcher, supra note 100, at 373 (explaining the
“Christmas Tree Effect”). Professor Adam Kolber commented on Judge Gertner’s concerns,
remarking that over a decade ago, judges and scholars initially raised the same concerns relative to
the admission of CAT and structural MRI scans in cases involving closed head trauma. Panel 4,
supra note 1, at 13. The concern at that time was that the lights and colors would confuse and
dazzle the jurors, a phenomenon commonly called “the Christmas Tree Effect.” Id. Yet, it is now
common to admit CT and structural MRIs in closed head trauma cases; it seems, Professor Kolber
remarked, that the Christmas Tree Effect has not prevented jurors from intelligently considering
such evidence in other kinds of brain related cases. Id. at 13–14.
135. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 16. Judge Gertner offered these comments during the question
and answer period of the panel.
136. Id.
137. Id.; see also Steven I. Friedland, Law, Science and Malingering, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 337,
339 (1998) (discussing the concerns the court faces regarding malingering).
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objectively verifiable.138 She suggested that the law might begin to break
down the distinction between physical and mental, and objective and
subjective.139 She re emphasized her earlier point, however, that clinical
and research measures of brain states and other physiological states will
“never map 100 percent onto [legal concepts of] pain and suffering and the
quantitative measures of [the value of] pain.”140
IV.
REMARKS OF PROFESSOR STACEY TOVINO: NEUROIMAGING OF
PAIN HAS CONCRETE LEGAL POTENTIAL BUT COULD REINSCRIBE
EXISTING INEQUALITIES
Professor Tovino discussed three areas of law that she believes could
be affected by advances in the neuroscientific understanding of pain, and by
pain imaging in particular.141 She discussed the Social Security Disability
Insurance (“SSDI”) regime, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),
and various state law regimes relating to the abuse of children, the elderly,
and other vulnerable populations.142 She concluded by sounding a note of
caution drawn from her years in practice about the over zealous adoption of
new sciences by the plaintiffs’ bar, particularly in areas relating to
neuroscience and neuroimaging.143
SSDI is one area of the law that Professor Tovino believes will be
greatly affected if neuroimaging can be introduced as proof of pain.144
SSDI statutes, she noted, practically “beg for images” because “both the
SSDI statute and regulations say that an individual statement as to pain
‘shall not alone be conclusive evidence of disability.’”145 Instead, the
138. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 16; see also Erica Goldberg, Emotional Duties, 47 CONN. L.
REV. 809, 818 (2015) (describing tort law’s distinction between physical and emotional harm for
“fear of fraudulent claims due to the subjective and unprovable nature of emotional injury”).
139. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 16.
140. Id. (responding to a question as to whether the fMRI can provide an objective measure of
pain when considering race and gender discrimination); see also The Experiential Future, supra
note 2, at 600–04 (outlining five major obstacles to neuroimaging pain assessment techniques
including: generalizing pain degrees across groups, inability to measure individual variations, the
unknown effects of chronic pain, the sensory versus cognitive components of pain, and the
inability to measure malingered pain).
141. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 8–12.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 12 (describing her personal experiences of defending hospice workers who did not
know their patients were in pain).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 10; see also 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A) (2012); How We Evaluate Symptoms,
Including Pain, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (2014). Interestingly, other professional organizations, like
the American Pain Society, do not require additional proof of pain, stating “that the patient’s self
report of pain is the single most reliable indicator of pain.” See AM. PAIN SOC’Y, PAIN: CURRENT
UNDERSTANDING OF ASSESSMENT, MANAGEMENT, AND TREATMENTS 4 (2012).
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statutes and regulations call for claimants to “prove that there is physical or
mental impairment resulting from an anatomical, physiological, or
psychological abnormality that can be shown by medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.”146 Claimants and
adjudicators emphasize the word “shown” in the regulations, creating a bias
in favor of image based forms of medical evidence, like an x-ray or an
fMRI.147 She went on to explain that it is “because of [the] language that
we have in our federal statutes and regulations that I know individuals will
almost be compelled to try to introduce neuroimaging evidence of their
pain” if it is available.148
The SSDI regulations further state that pain “shall not alone be
conclusive evidence of [a] disability.”149 What is “so interesting” about this
is that the requirements of the regulation are “almost exactly the opposite”
of the definitions of pain and proof of pain that are embraced by medical
organizations.150 For example, she noted that “the American Pain Society
states that the patient’s self report of pain is the single most reliable
indicator of pain.”151
Health insurance is another realm that would potentially be affected by
the neuroimaging of pain.152 As an expert in mental health parity law,153
Professor Tovino was particularly concerned with the coverage (or lack
thereof) of mental health issues under government insurance plans.154 As
health insurance laws currently stand, there is no “federal definition of
mental health and substance use disorder benefits that would be given equal

146. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 10; 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529.
147. See Mickles v. Shalala, 29 F.3d 918, 928–29 (4th Cir. 1994) (sustaining an ALJ denial of
benefits because after four doctors and extensive testing—including a CAT scan, ultrasound
examinations, an electromyogram, a nerve conduction study, upper gastrointestinal studies,
serological tests, and bone tests—they could not find the alleged pain).
148. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 10.
149. Id.; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529.
150. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 10; see also AM. PAIN SOC’Y, supra note 145 (defining pain as a
purely subjective analysis with no objective measures).
151. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 10; AM. PAIN SOC’Y, supra note 145.
152. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 10; see generally Tovino, supra note 119, at 469–78 (analyzing
the effects of neuroimaging examinations on health insurance coverage and payouts).
153. Tovino, supra note 119.
154. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 10. According to Professor Tovino, mental health parity law
“essentially tries to get rid of the distinctions [between] physical health conditions and mental
health conditions in the context of health insurance.” Id. at 12; see also Stacey A. Tovino,
Reforming State Mental Health Parity Law, HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 455, 456 (2011)
(analyzing divergent state parity laws and justifying expanding state parity laws by eliminating
“biologically-based” and “severe mental illness” artificial distinctions, and proposing a model
uniform mental health parity law).

2015]

PANEL 4

317

protection.”155 Instead, each state must “designate or pick something called
an ‘essential health benefits benchmark plan.’”156 Until at least 2015, states
must offer benefits for any mental health issue covered under their plan, but
are not required to do so for any mental health issue not listed in the
plan.157 This, she noted, has far reaching effects for American citizens with
mental health issues, and Professor Tovino explained how this has played
out in the health care system:158
some states’ benchmark plans still contain exclusion for
pain management services to the extent they’re not offered
through hospice, which means that we still have, even post
Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, post the Paul Wellstone
and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addition
Equity Act of 2008, and post Affordable Care Act of 2010,
we still have discrimination against individuals with mental
health conditions, especially chronic and acute pain in the
context of health insurance.159
If patients were able to provide neuroimaging as proof of their chronic
or acute pain, then the discrimination that exists in relation to health
insurance coverage of mental health conditions could potentially be reduced
or eliminated.160 More generally, Professor Tovino’s observation about the
lack of parity coverage for pain management of conditions that fall under
155. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 10; see also Stacey A. Tovino, All Illnesses Are (Not) Created
Equal: Reforming Federal Mental Health Insurance Law, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 7–9 (2012)
(describing how most public health care beneficiaries and some individuals with private insurance
do not have a federal legal right to equal physical and mental health insurance benefits); cf. B.
Jessie Hill, What is the Meaning of Health? Constitutional Implications of Defining “Medical
Necessity” and “Essential Health Benefits” Under the Affordable Care Act, 38 AM. J.L. & MED.
445, 449–50 (2012) (analyzing the “circularity” in defining the terms “medical necessity” and
“essential health benefits” due to statutes leaving other entities, such as states or insurers, to create
the definitions).
156. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 10; see Hill, supra note 155, at 446 (describing how the
Affordable Care Act grants states the authority to define the term “essential health benefits” and to
choose a package of essential benefits to be provided).
157. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 10; Tovino, supra note 155, at 42–44.
158. Tovino, supra note 155, at 12; see infra text accompanying notes 159–60.
159. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 12; see also Tovino, supra note 155, at 43–44 (distinguishing
between grandfathered and non-grandfathered insurance plans and detailing how many health
plans are exempt from providing mental health and substance use disorder benefits).
160. Stacey A. Tovino, Neuroscience and Health Law: An Integrative Approach?, 42 AKRON
L. REV. 469, 495–97 (2009) (concluding that neuroimaging can improve the passage and nondiscriminatory application of mental health parity laws, and can be used as evidence to
demonstrate that mental health disorders are biological in nature, which means that the distinction
between physical and mental illness is artificial).
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the rubric of mental health diagnoses shows just how the classification
(whether legal, medical, or administrative) of chronic pain conditions as
“psychiatric” rather than the straightforward “medical” classification leads
to discriminatory limitations on denials of care.161 This points to the crucial
issue of clarifying, for legal and medical actors, the relationship between
pain and negative emotion and establishing that the presence of negative
emotion in the pain experience should not be an excluding condition for the
provision of pain management services.162
The neuroimaging of pain could also possibly impact abuse and
neglect laws.163 Professor Tovino noted that various branches of law “have
always struggled” with questions related to the kinds of pain inflicted by
child abuse and elder abuse (or the abuse of other vulnerable populations,
like persons living in care facilities).164 She noted that many forms of abuse
do not involve direct physical battery like being “kicked or punched, but
what has happened to them causes them a lot of physical pain and suffering
[and] also emotional pain and suffering.”165 Most of the pertinent statutes
and regulations “do define physical abuse to include physical pain, and then
they also define emotional abuse to include emotional pain”; but plaintiffs
have typically been unable to definitively prove any long lasting physical or
emotional pain experienced as a result of abuse or neglect.166 The
neuroimaging of pain, she suggested, could shed light on the long lasting

161. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 12 (describing how neuroimaging studies led to the
reclassification of gambling from an impulse disorder to something more akin to a substance
abuse disorder, which qualified gambling addicts for mental health services under the Affordable
Care Act); see generally Tovino, supra note 155 (analyzing the effects of distinguishing between
physical and mental illness, and the resulting discrimination against mental health coverage).
162. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 12; see also Goldberg, supra note 138, at 826 (discussing the
difficulties of measuring “emotional harm” and “psychic injuries,” and recent advances in
identifying changes in neural pathways of patients suffering from PTSD).
163. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 11.
164. Id. at 12; see also The Experiential Future, supra note 2, at 624–26 (describing how
neuroimaging can supplement evidence in physical or sexual abuse cases if the victim is either
unable to communicate or may be considered unreliable).
165. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 12; see generally Debra Niehoff, Invisible Scars: The
Neurobiological Consequences of Child Abuse, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 847, 861 (2007) (detailing,
through the use of neuroimaging, the extensive, long term trauma associated with child
maltreatment, abuse, and neglect).
166. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 12; see also 42 U.S.C. § 5119c (2012) ([C]hild abuse crime [is] .
. . a crime committed under any law of a State that involves the physical or mental injury, sexual
abuse or exploitation, negligent treatment, or maltreatment of a child by any person . . . .”); 45
C.F.R. § 1340.2 (2014) (defining “child abuse and neglect” as “the physical or mental injury,
sexual abuse or exploitation, negligent treatment, or maltreatment of a child . . . .”); The
Experiential Future, supra note 2, at 624 (describing how of the three million cases referred to
child protective services, child sexual abuse can rarely be diagnosed because physical findings are
often absent).
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effects of indirect physical and emotional pain, and, in particular, on the
formative effects of early life physical and emotional pain.167 The use of
neuroimaging in this capacity could have far reaching effects on this area of
the law.168
Professor Tovino noted that new understandings of chronic pain
diseases may be informing anti-discrimination laws under the ADA.169
Until 2008, a person who suffered from a chronic pain condition could not
be considered disabled under the Act if the person’s pain responded to
treatment—that is, if the person could take medication that reduced his
daily pain to a tolerable level, then he would not qualify as disabled for
ADA purposes.170
This created a distinction under the ADA regime between pain
conditions and other medical conditions whose impairments can be
mitigated.171 If a person is deaf, for example, but can hear using a
prosthetic device like a cochlear implant, he continues to be a deaf
individual with a qualifying disability, entitling him to protection under the
ADA.172 The use of a prosthetic that reduces the impairment caused by the
disability still means that the person is qualified as “disabled” for purposes
of the Act.173 In 2008, the ADA Amendments Act removed this distinction,
acknowledging that even if treatment improves the degree of impairment
167. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 11; see also Ruth Eckstein Grunau, Neonatal Pain in Very
Preterm Infants: Long-Term Effects on Brain, Neurodevelopment and Pain Reactivity, 4 RAMBAM
MAIMONIDES MEDICAL JOURNAL [RAMBAM MAIMONIDES MED J] 1, 3 (2013) (Isr.) (explaining
the use of MRIs to track brain development following neonatal pain).
168. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 11; see also Stacey A. Tovino, Functional Neuroimaging and the
Law: Trends and Directions for Future Scholarship, 7 AM. J. BIOETHICS 44, 46, 52 (2007)
[hereinafter Functional Neuroimaging and the Law] (explaining the potential implications for
understanding pain in the context of tort and criminal law).
169. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 11; see also Functional Neuroimaging and the Law, supra note
168, at 48 (noting the potential of neuroimaging to identify a disability, and enabling employers to
screen individuals based on the information).
170. Tovino, supra note 155, at 11; see also 42 U.S.C. §12102(2) (1990) (defining “disability”
as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities
of an individual, a record of such impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment);
see also 42 U.S.C. §12102(4)(E) (2009) (“[T]he determination of whether an impairment
substantially limits a major life activity shall be made without regard to the ameliorative effects of
mitigating measures.”).
171. Tovino, supra note 155, at 11; compare 42 U.S.C. §12102(2) (1990) (making no mention
of potential pain mitigation) with 42 U.S.C. §12102(4)(E) (2009) (stating that making a
determination as to whether an impairment limits a life activity or not will be done without
looking to any mitigating circumstances or measures).
172. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i)(I) (2009) (listing hearing aids and cochlear implants as
examples of mitigating measures that are not regarded in the determination of impairment). But
see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(ii) (2009) (“[T]he mitigating measures of ordinary eyeglasses or
contact lenses shall be considered . . . .”).
173. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i)(I) (2009).
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imposed by a chronic pain condition, the individual continues to suffer from
an ongoing medical condition that may be disabling.174 This formal parity
may implicitly recognize a medical advance that the scientists in this
conference have described: pain is both a symptom and a disease in itself—
the presence or absence of the symptom of pain on a given day does not
indicate whether the person suffers from an ongoing chronic pain
disorder.175 Thus, a person with a chronic pain condition may have a
symptom free day without being cured of the disease with its complex and
multi faceted etiology.176
Professor Tovino then offered with some words of caution, grounded
in her role as a civil and regulatory attorney. She described seeing how
quickly new technology involving brain imaging can pervade areas of
law.177 She voiced particular concern with overeager plaintiffs adopting
developing science, warning:
whenever we have an advance in the neuroscientific
understanding of a particular health condition or an
advance in neuroimaging, you just have literally no idea
how quickly plaintiffs, patients, individuals, claimants,
whatever you want to call them, will jump on that
bandwagon and try to use it to achieve whatever goal they
may have.178
Professor Tovino voiced some concerns regarding the use of
neuroimaging as proof of pain.179 Drawing on her work as a medical
historian, she grounded her cautions with important lessons from history.180
She discussed the historically inequitable treatment of pain across various
social strata, “including class, race, age, gender, occupation, and other

174. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D) (2009) (“An impairment that is episodic or in remission is a
disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active.”).
175. See The Experiential Future, supra note 2, at 597 (noting the problems inherent in
intersubjective evaluations of pain, and explaining how scientific advances can help alleviate
them).
176. See id. at 600 (listing pain’s complex nature as one of five obstacles facing new pain
evaluating technology).
177. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 10; see also Jay D. Aronson, The Law’s Use of Brain Evidence, 6
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 93, 94 (2010) (noting the potential dangers of applying new technology
to the law).
178. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 10.
179. Id. at 8.
180. Id.
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indicia of social status and hierarchy.”181 She then urged the members of
the conference to be mindful of persistent inequities in the practice of
medicine and the provision of adequate pain relief to women and minorities
in particular.182
One particularly troubling example in the history of medicine involves
the administration of anesthesia, which historically was governed by a
“complex moral calculus.”183 Physicians historically were less likely to
dispense pain medication to “individuals of lower class, including racial and
ethnic minorities.”184 Similarly, in a legal forum, the pain complaints of
blue collar citizens were often rejected.185 After railway accidents in both
the United States and Great Britain, “many physicians rejected injured
laborers and railway and other common carrier passengers’ complaints of
pain.”186 Put simply, Professor Tovino opined, the pain of the privileged
mattered while the pain of the poor did not.187
In discussing the long history of inequitable pain treatment, Professor
Tovino went on to note the “very poor history of experimenting on racial
and ethnic minorities, and inflicting pain on them in human subjects
research.”188 Invasive studies typically were not conducted on subjects
from “racial and ethnic majorities, including Caucasian Americans.”189
Professor Tovino discussed the disturbing case of Dr. J. Marion Sims, a
physician who “conducted experimental surgical interventions for
vesicovaginal fistulas on populations of African American slave women,

181. Id.; see generally Dania Palanker, Note, Enslaved by Pain: How the U.S. Public Health
System Adds to Disparities in Pain Treatment for African Americans, 15 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L.
& POL’Y 847 (2008) (tracing the disparate pain treatment of African Americans in the United
States from slavery to the present).
182. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 8.
183. Id.; see also Daniel Goldberg, Pain Without Lesion: Debate Among American
Neurologists, 1850–1900, 15 INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES IN THE LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY
[19] 1, 11 (2012) (U.K.).
184. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 8; see also Palanker, supra note 181, at 856 (describing the
painful experiments performed on slaves without pain medication or sedation).
185. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 8; see also Goldberg, supra note 183 (explaining how pain
treatment in the nineteenth century was distributed according to social strata).
186. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 8; see also Goldberg, supra note 183 (“In both Great Britain and
the USA, many physicians and neurologists rejected injured workers and railway passengers’
complaints of injury following railway accidents.”).
187. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 9.
188. Id.; see also Palanker, supra note 181, at 855–56 (explaining the Tuskegee Syphilis
Experiment and the resulting mistrust of the American healthcare system by African Americans).
189. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 9.
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but not Caucasian women, due to his belief that slaves had much lower
sensitivity to pain than his white patients.”190
These examples remain relevant as concerns relating to the
“inequitable under-treatment” of pain along class and racial lines continue
to pervade health care today.191 In 2011, Professor Tovino noted, the
Institute of Medicine declared that the “inequitable treatment of pain is so
significant that it is a public health problem.”192 This problem is
particularly prevalent in emergency rooms since there are few, if any,
objective tests to determine if someone is in pain.193 The administration of
pain medicine or other pain management techniques is a highly subjective
action left to doctors’ discretion.194 These discretionary determinations may
incorporate the biases prevalent in the culture where the physician lives and
practices; thus, “multiple current studies show that physicians have
unconscious racial and ethnic biases when deciding whether or not” to
prescribe pain medicine.195 To prevent history from repeating itself as the
science of pain imaging progresses, Professor Tovino emphasized that it is
important to acknowledge and learn from these examples of the inequitable
treatment of pain.196

190. Id.; see also Goldberg, supra note 183, at 23 n.40 (“[P]art of the reason J. Marion Sims
conducted his experiments regarding a surgical intervention for vesicovaginal fistula on African
American slave women was due to his belief that the slaves had much lower sensitivity to pain
than his white patients.”).
191. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 9; see also Palanker, supra note 181, at 856 (noting that although
the most blatant segregation ended with the Civil Rights Act and the creation of Medicare,
remnants continue today).
192. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 9; INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., REPORT BRIEF:
RELIEVING PAIN IN AMERICA: A BLUEPRINT FROM TRANSFORMING PREVENTION, CARE,
EDUCATION,
AND
RESEARCH
1
(2011),
available
at
http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/2011/Relieving-Pain-in-America-ABlueprint-for-Transforming-Prevention-Care-EducationResearch/Pain%20Research%202011%20Report%20Brief.pdf.
193. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 9; see also Palanker, supra note 181, at 851–52 (describing a
1996 study of emergency room prescribing practices, finding that African Americans received
fewer analgesics).
194. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 9; see also Palanker, supra note 181, at 866–67 (noting that
physician bias can affect treatment decisions and communication with a patient).
195. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 9; see also Palanker, supra note 181, at 866–67 (citing an
American Medical Association report finding that physicians harbor racial stereotypes that affect
treatment decisions).
196. See Panel 4, supra note 1, at 8.

